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COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE IN
NEVADA:  A PROPOSAL
Elham Roohani*
INTRODUCTION
As global society rapidly moves from an economy based on physical labor
to an economy comprised of a knowledge-based workforce, businesses have
been forced to adapt to protect their intangible assets.1  Recently, companies
have realized their value lies more in the “creative services provided by the
human capital of their employees” and less with “physical assets that can be
owned, sold, or leveraged.”2  However, while businesses have created highly
sophisticated employment agreements to protect their human capital, the law
governing those employment agreements has been slower to develop.3
Although most states have laws in this area, those laws have not been updated
to reflect modern business trends and protect a company’s intangible assets.4
Moreover, a minority of states, including Nevada, have little or no controlling
law on business owned intellectual property and its effect on employment.5
This Note offers a balanced standard for Nevada’s restrictive covenant
laws in the employment context.6  First, Part I defines “covenants not to com-
pete” and explains how they have developed.  Second, Part II examines other
* J.D. Candidate, May 2010, William S. Boyd School of Law.  Special thanks to Professor
Elaine Shoben, for her patient guidance, and Nima Khomassi, for his constant support.
1 Norman D. Bishara, Covenants Not to Compete in a Knowledge Economy:  Balancing
Innovation from Employee Mobility Against Legal Protection for Human Capital Invest-
ment, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 287, 295 (2006).
2 Id. at 296.
3 Id. at 295.
4 See generally ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1402 (2003); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE
§ 16600 (West 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113 (West 2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
6, § 2707 (2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-1-2-1 (West 2006); IOWA CODE ANN. § 553.4 (West
1997); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921 (Supp. 2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.774a
(West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325D.51 (West 2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-703
(2007); NEV. REV. STAT.  § 613.200 (2007); N.D. CENT. Code § 9-08-06 (2008); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAWS § 53-9-11 (2004).
5 Thomas M. Hogan, Note, Uncertainty in the Employment Context:  Which Types of
Restrictive Covenants are Enforceable?, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 429, 438 (2006) (discussing
some limited statutes that “leave a lot of discretion to the courts”).
6 A covenant is a “formal agreement or promise.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 419 (9th ed.
2009).  Therefore, a restrictive covenant is a promise or agreement that restricts the actions
of one of the parties to the agreement. See id. at 393.  A noncompetition covenant, which is
a type of restrictive covenant, is a “promise . . . not to engage in the same type of business
for a stated time in the same market as the buyer, partner, or employer.” Id. at 420.  Non-
competition covenants are also interchangeably called “noncompetition agreement; non-
compete covenant; covenant not to compete; restrictive covenant; promise not to compete:
contract not to compete.” Id.
260
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states’ treatment of restrictive covenants in the employment context.  Third,
part III proposes a solution for Nevada that balances tensions between employ-
ers and employees in light of Nevada’s unique workforce and economic
makeup.  By discussing Nevada’s specific considerations, this Note aims to
guide Nevada’s legislators when discussing and adopting new laws respecting
covenants not to compete.
I. COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE
A. What are Covenants Not To Compete?
Covenants not to compete are “contractual provisions where the parties
agree not to compete with each other for a certain time period in a particular
geographic location.”7  “By their very nature,” covenants not to compete limit
competition by “imped[ing] the full participation of a competitor in a busi-
ness.”8  Specifically, these covenants effectively curb former employees from
seeking and obtaining future employment.9  Despite harsh limitations, cove-
nants not to compete serve a valuable commercial purpose by allowing employ-
ers to invest time and money into their employees.10  For example, employers
are able to train employees, develop relationships with clients, and share confi-
dential information, without fear that the employee will “run off” with their
investment only to benefit a competitor.11  Through these covenants, businesses
can develop their human capital without apprehension that competitors will
inadvertently benefit from investments in their employee.
Noncompetition covenants are “enforceable only to the extent that” they
are reasonable.12  Courts determine the reasonability of these covenants by
weighing three factors:  duration, breadth, and geographic scope.13  First, the
duration of covenants not to compete can be “no greater than necessary to pro-
vide reasonable protection to the employer.”14  Thus, courts will not uphold
ambiguous provisions or indefinite extension periods because the unlimited
duration provides the employer with unreasonable protection.15
Second, the restriction can be broad enough to “afford a fair protection to
the interests of” the employer, but “not so large as to interfere with the interests
7 2 MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 8.1 (3d ed. 2004).
8 Edward T. Ellis, Protection of Intangible Business Assets:  Trade Secrets in the Age of
Federal Computer Legislation, in ALI-ABA, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EMPLOYMENT




12 Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, Putting the Blue Pencil Down:  An Argument for Specificity in
Noncompete Agreements, 86 NEB. L. REV. 672, 677 (2008) (stating that “noncompete agree-
ments are enforceable only to the extent that they are reasonably necessary to protect nar-
rowly defined and well recognized employer interests”).
13 Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not To Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625, 626,
640 (1960) (“The court’s function was to determine ‘what is a reasonable restraint with
reference to the particular case.’” (quoting Tallis v. Tallis, 118 Eng. Rep. 482 (Q.B. 1853))).
14 Noncompetition Covenants, 20 NO. 5 Bus. Torts. Rep. 148, 149 (Mar. 2008) [hereinafter
Covenants 1].
15 See id.
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of the public.”16  Covenants not to compete protect a variety of interests.  Non-
compete agreements “are designed to prohibit an employee from competing
with his employer after the termination of the employment agreement.”17
Therefore, businesses use covenants not to compete to protect trade secrets,
confidential information, good will, an employee’s unique and extraordinary
skills they possessed before beginning their employment, and against competi-
tors profiting from any specialized training and skills the employer provided to
the employee.18
Finally, geographic restrictions contained in the noncompetition covenant
may only extend to areas in which the employee established contacts during the
course of employment.19  Notably, in a unique case,20 the court upheld a cove-
nant not to compete within a specific radius of every existing franchise.21  In
Boulanger v. Dunkin’ Donuts,22 Boulanger, the plaintiff, bought a Dunkin’
Donuts franchise, and signed the accompanying noncompetition agreement.23
After disagreements with Dunkin’ Donuts about expanding the establishment,
Boulanger closed his Dunkin’ Donuts store.24  Thereafter, he contacted Honey
Dew Donuts, Dunkin’ Donuts’ direct competitor, to buy a franchise.25  Dunkin’
Donuts refused to waive the noncompetition covenant and Boulanger sued to
invalidate the covenant not to compete.26  The court held that the covenant was
reasonable and enjoined Boulanger from competing within a five-mile radius of
every existing Dunkin’ Donuts store.27
While most corporations choose to incorporate in states with favorable
incorporation laws, some ex-employees will intentionally incorporate a com-
peting business in a state that has unfavorable incorporation laws but that disfa-
vors non-competition agreements in an attempt to circumvent a validly
executed non-compete covenant.28  For example, in Ferrofluidics Corporation
v. Advanced Vacuum,29 the First Circuit rejected an ex-employee’s attempt to
apply California law by incorporating a competing business in California, when
the parties executed the contract in Massachusetts.30  The employee attempted
16 Blake, supra note 13, at 639.
17 Pivateau, supra note 12, at 676.
18 Noncompetition Covenants, 20 NO. 1 Bus. Torts Rep. 20, 21 (Nov. 2007) [hereinafter
Covenants 2].
19 Blake, supra note 13, at 680; Covenants 1, supra note 14, at 149.
20 Boulanger v. Dunkin’ Donuts Inc., 815 N.E.2d 572 (Mass. 2004).
21 J. Michael Dady, Evaluating the Termination Decision—Common Law and Statutory
Considerations, in Practicing Law Institute, 44th Annual Advanced Antitrust Seminar:  Dis-
tribution & Marketing 753 (Practicing Law Inst. 2005) (the court upheld the agreement terms
and enjoined Boulanger from competing within a specific radius of every existing Dunkin’
Donuts).
22 Boulanger, 815 N.E.2d at 572.
23 Id. at 575-76.
24 Id. at 576 n.5.
25 Id. at 576.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 581.
28 Ferrofluidics Corp. v. Advanced Vacuum Components, Inc., 968 F.2d 1463, 1465-66 (1st
Cir. 1992).
29 Id.
30 Id. at 1467.
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to choose California as controlling law because California law disfavors cove-
nants not to compete.31  To that end, the Court did not allow the employee to
choose California’s favorable state law in order to prevail on his claim.32  Fur-
thermore, the Court reaffirmed that covenants not to compete are limited to
apply only to the extent necessary to protect legitimate employer interests.33
Lastly, covenants that contain otherwise reasonable terms may be void if
they contradict public policy.34  Restrictive covenants may violate public pol-
icy in several ways.35  First, the covenant might have a substantial effect on
third parties.36  For example, in Graham v. Cirocco,37 the Kansas Court of
Appeals would not enforce a covenant that restricted the availability of special-
ized medical care because the covenant violated public policy.38  In Graham,
two physicians entered into a partnership contract that contained a covenant not
to compete for two years within a specific geographical radius.39  After one
partner left, he opened a competing practice right next door to the original
business.40  The court reasoned that the need for specialized medical profes-
sionals significantly outweighs any harm to the parties.41
Businesses frequently use covenants not to compete to protect trade
secrets.42  The motivation behind protecting trade secrets is simple:  prevent
unfair competition and invasion of privacy while promoting innovation, pro-
gress, and efficiency.43  Protecting an employer’s interest in trade secrets is
reasonable when it involves the employer’s own “detailed confidential
processes which [are] kept secret from [its] customers and competitors.”44  In
protecting trade secrets, courts consider several factors:
(1)  the extent to which people outside the business know the information
(2)  the extent to which employees and others involved in the business know the
information
(3)  the extent of measures the employer took to prevent dissemination of the
information
(4)  the information’s value to the employer and its competitors
31 Id. at 1466, 1468.
32 Id. at 1467-68.
33 Id. at 1471; ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at § 8.5.
34 See Covenants 1, supra note 14, at 149.
35 ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 362.
36 Id.
37 Graham v. Cirocco, 69 P.3d 194 (Kan. Ct. App. 2003).
38 Id. at 200.
39 Id. at 196.  Although geographic limitations that protect legitimate employer interests are
reasonable, any reach beyond those areas is deemed unreasonable. Id. at 198-199.  How-
ever, here, geographic reasonability was not the main concern. Id. at 197-99.
40 Id. at 197.
41 Id. at 200.  As the purpose of the covenant was to limit competition in a certain geo-
graphic area, the court effectively held the entire non-competition covenant invalid by
allowing the competing doctor to continue to practice next door.  Ultimately, the court based
its decision on public policy.
42 See Jeremy P. Cattani et al., Employment Contracts, in 1 MASSACHUSETTS CONTINUING
LEGAL EDUCATION, MASSACHUSETTS EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.1.4(b) (2008).
43 Ellis, supra note 8, at 963.
44 Cattani et al., supra note 42, § 2.1.4(b) (quoting Novelty Bias Binding Co. v. Shevrin,
342 Mass. 714, 715 (1961).
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(5)  the amount of money or effort the employer expended to developing the informa-
tion; and
(6)  the ease or difficulty with which others could acquire or duplicate the
information.45
The employer seeking enforcement of a covenant bears the burden of
proving that the information is confidential.46  To determine whether the infor-
mation is confidential, courts consider factors such as whether the information
is “compiled and cultivated internally,” or whether it entails “expansion plans,
merchandising strategies, product mixes, and retail devices.”47  Here, the rea-
soning seems to be that if the information was developed by the company for
the company, then that information is more likely to be confidential.  Regard-
less, courts may issue a narrowly tailored injunction to protect the employer’s
confidential information.48
B. Historical Development
A historical overview of covenants not to compete is essential to under-
standing the potential benefits of developing a balanced structure for Nevada
law affecting covenants not to compete.  Although the pendulum of protection
has swung back and forth between employers and employees for hundreds of
years, Nevada is currently positioned to address modern trends and temper any
volatility in this area of the law.
In the employment context, covenants not to compete began to emerge
about five hundred years ago.49  Since then, the court’s treatment of covenants
has gone through four distinct stages as its priorities shifted back and forth
between protecting employers and employees.  First, courts held that covenants
not to compete were an undue restraint on trade that offended public policy.50
This early development began during the English guild system.51  During this
period, masters used covenants to bind their apprentices from competing
against the master’s business in the same geographical area for unreasonably
long periods.52  Due to the decreased mobility of workers based on the feudal
communities, these covenants acted as an absolute restraint on trade.53  The
courts disfavored these covenants until Mitchel v. Reynolds,54 decided in
1711.55  In Mitchel, a court enforced a non-competition agreement because the





49 Use of restrictive covenants began in England as early as the fifteenth century.  T. Leigh
Anenson, The Role of Equity in Employment Noncompetition Cases, 42 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 1
(2005).  Covenants not to compete are also used to protect goodwill through business
purchases.  Richard Ullman, Tax Treatment of Covenants Not To Compete:  A Problem of
Purchase Price Allocation, 67 YALE L.J. 1261, 1265 (1958).
50 ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 358.
51 Anenson, supra note 49, at 5.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 6.
54 Mitchel v. Reynolds, (1711) 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B.).
55 Id.; see also Hogan, supra note 5, at 433-34.
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lease payments.56 Mitchel laid the foundation for courts to later adopt a more
tempered approach by enforcing restrictive covenants that were fair and
reasonable.57
During the Industrial Revolution, courts responded to increased worker
mobility by adopting a reasonableness standard for enforcing non-competition
covenants.58  During this time, the courts examined reasonableness in terms of
time, scope, and employer’s interests.59  Although courts continued to disfavor
restrictive covenants and “judicial hostility to post-employment restrictions
remained,” the laws continued to be notably pro-employer.60  During the Great
Depression, the pendulum swung back in favor of employee rights as the courts
sought to foster economic growth.61  Consequently, courts placed increasingly
heavy burdens on employers and demanded more rigorous proof of their pro-
tected interests and reasonableness of the restraint.62
With the information age, courts then shifted back to a reasonable analysis
with current trends favoring employer protection.63  Increased mobility and the
heightened need for employee training and skills drove this judicial reversion.64
Courts retreated to a reasonableness analysis to determine whether employers
had a legitimate protectable interest in (1) retaining a customer base and (2)
protecting confidential trade secrets and information.65
C. Tensions between Employers and Employees
The inherent nature and purpose of covenants not to compete creates a
palpable tension between employers and employees.  In some cases, the non-
competition agreement “creates an unnecessary and unfair advantage for one
party.”66  For example, an employer may gain an unfair advantage by using
“economic coercion to force all employees to promise that they will not work
for competitors if they ever leave the company.”67  This creates a restraint on
former employees and unequal “bargaining power” favoring the employer.68
Consequently, discharged employees often fear restrictive covenants will hin-
der their ability to obtain new employment.69
Courts have noted that covenants generally are not assignable because loy-
alty to one’s long-time employer does not naturally pass to a new employer.70
56 Mitchel, 24 Eng. Rep. at 348.
57 Anenson, supra note 49, at 2 n.4; Blake, supra note 13, at 629-31 (citing Mitchel, 24
Eng. Rep. at 348); Hogan, supra note 5, at 433-34.
58 Anenson, supra note 49, at 5.
59 Id. at 8.
60 Id. at 2.
61 Id. at 11.
62 Michael J. Garrison & John T. Wendt, The Evolving Law of Employee Noncompete
Agreements:  Recent Trends and an Alternative Policy Approach, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 107,
110-111 (Spring 2008).
63 Anenson, supra note 49, at 2, 12.
64 Id. at 16.
65 Id. at 13-14.
66 ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 7, § 8.1.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. § 8.3.
70 Id. § 8.1.
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Thus, courts have given covenants not to compete little to no effect in company
sales, unless the employee signs a new agreement with the new owner.71
Meanwhile, employers fear that employee training, relationships employees
develop with clients, confidential company information, and company invest-
ment into human capital will disappear when an employee leaves the
company.72
Public policy arguments mirror the concerns of employers and employ-
ees.73  Employers argue that society benefits from enforcing post-employment
restrictive covenants.74  Specifically, they contend that enforcement protects
private ownership interests, facilitates investment in research, and encourages
investment in and development of human resources.75  On the other hand,
employees argue that the public pays a high price for covenant enforcement
including limited competition, impediments in the free flow of information, and
lack of workers’ economic mobility.76  Plaintiff Kai-Fu Lee raised these argu-
ments, among others, in Google v. Microsoft.77  In that case, Lee, a Microsoft
employee, left the company to work for Google, a direct competitor.78  Accord-
ingly, Microsoft sued Lee in the State of Washington for breach of covenant
not to compete and sought a temporary restraining order against Google and
Lee.79  The court granted the injunction with limited scope,80 allowing both
sides to claim victory.81  The outcome seemed to balance employer and
employee rights but in reality, it was merely a public relations strategy to avoid
negative publicity.
II. OVERVIEW OF JURISDICTIONAL TREATMENT:  OTHER STATES’
TREATMENT OF COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE
When developing a standard, Nevada could benefit from looking to other
states’ solutions and learning from their treatment of employment covenants.
Notably, treatment of covenants not to compete is purely a state issue.82  Most
states have statutes on the subject and many of those statutes have evolved to
account for changing trends.83  Nonetheless, many state legislatures have
71 Id.
72 Ellis, supra note 8, at 949.
73 See, e.g., Blake, supra note 13, at 652 (discussing the public policy argument in favor of
protecting the employer’s investment in employee-training programs).
74 Id.
75 Anenson, supra note 49, at 3 n.10; Blake, supra note 13, at 652; Ronald J. Gilson, The
Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts:  Silicon Valley, Route 128, and
Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 575, 627-29 (1999).
76 Anenson, supra note 49, at 3.
77 Google, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 415 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (N.D. Cal. 2005); see Garrison &
Wendt, supra note 62, at 107-11 (discussing Google).
78 Google, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 2d at 1019.
79 Id. at 1019-20.
80 Id.; Garrison & Wendt, supra note 62, at 110.
81 Garrison & Wendt, supra note 62, at 110.
82 ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 7, § 8.6.
83 Id.; see generally ARIZ. REV. STAT. §44-1402 (2003); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600
(West 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113 (West 2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2707
(2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-1-2-1(West 2006); IOWA CODE ANN. § 553.4 (West 1997); LA.
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actively endeavored to enact laws that limit covenants in the employment
context.84
State statutes regarding covenants not to compete generally fall into one of
three categories:  (1) statutes generally prohibiting any restraint of trade, (2)
statutes specifically addressing covenants not to compete in employment con-
tracts, or (3) statutes addressing covenants not to compete but only with respect
to specific professions.85  Some states, such as Colorado, have statutes that fall
into two categories with statutes that address noncompetition covenants in
employment contracts generally and the same covenants with respect to certain
professions specifically.86
States that fall into the general prohibition category are Arizona,87 Califor-
nia,88 Iowa,89 Indiana,90 Minnesota,91 and North Dakota.92  These statutes
favor a strong protection of employee rights.93  For example, California takes a
liberal approach to the general restriction on trade.94  California’s statute disal-
lows and voids “every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in
a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind.”95  Notably, California busi-
nesses have not suffered significantly because of this statute as evidenced by
REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921 (Supp. 2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.774a (West 2002);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325D.51 (West 2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-703 (2007); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 613.200 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (2008); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 53-9-11 (2004).
84 ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 7, § 8.1.
85 Id. § 8.6.
86 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113 (West 2003) (subject to enumerated exceptions, sec-
tion (2) provides a general prohibition on covenants not to compete and section (3) addresses
covenants not to compete involving a physician’s right to practice medicine).
87 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1402 (2003) (providing only the general prohibition that “[a]
contract, combination or conspiracy between two or more people in restraint of, or to
monopolize, trade or commerce, any part of which is within this state is unlawful”).
88 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2008) (providing only the general prohibition
that “every contract by which anyone is restricted from engaging in a lawful profession,
trade or business of any kind is to that extent void”).
89 IOWA CODE ANN. § 553.4 (West 1997) (providing only the general prohibition that “[a]
contract, combination, or conspiracy between two or more people shall not restrain or
monopolize trade or commerce in a relevant market”).
90 IND. CODE ANN. § 24-1-2-1 (West 2006) (codifying a general prohibition stating that
“[e]very scheme, contract, or combination in restraint of trade or commerce, or to create or
carry out restrictions in trade or commerce, or to deny or refuse to any person participation,
on equal terms with others . . . is illegal”).  “The Indiana statutory prohibition against
restraint of trade does not apply to covenants not to compete in employment contracts.  The
common law in that jurisdiction nonetheless holds that restraints on competition between an
employer and former employee are not favored and are enforced only where the restraint is
reasonable.” ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 7, § 8.6.
91 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325D.51 (West 2004) (providing only the general prohibition that
“[a] contract, combination, or conspiracy between two or more persons in unreasonable
restraint of trade or commerce is unlawful”).
92 N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (2008) (providing, subject to enumerated exceptions, only
the general prohibition that “[e]very contract by which anyone is restrained from exercising
a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void”).
93 See supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
94 Hogan, supra note 5, at 435.
95 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2008).
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the success of many Silicon Valley technology-based enterprises.96  In Ronald
Gilson’s article, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Dis-
tricts:  Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, he suggests
that California’s unwillingness to enforce these covenants actually caused the
Silicon Valley business boom by allowing mobility of employees and informa-
tion.97  In particular, Gilson argues that increased employee mobility enabled
knowledge and information to move faster because employers wanted to reap
the rewards of their investment in human capital before the knowledge became
irrelevant and stale.98
The second category of state statutes specifically addresses covenants not
to compete in employment contracts.  States in this category are Colorado,99
Georgia,100 Michigan,101 Montana,102 and South Dakota.103  For example, Col-
orado disfavors covenants not to compete but recognizes and addresses a few
exceptions to the general prohibition:  protection of trade secrets, investment in
employee training, and proprietary information held by executive managerial
positions.104
The third category of state statutes only restricts covenants not to compete
that affect specific professions.  These states are Delaware,105 Colorado,106 and
Louisiana.107  The most common protected profession is medical practice.108
96 Gilson, supra note 75, at 575.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113 (West 2003) (specifically addressing covenants not to
compete which “restrict[ ] the right of any person to receive compensation for performance
of skilled or unskilled labor”); ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 381.  In Colorado, non-
competition agreements are generally void with three exceptions:  in relation to trade secrets,
specialized training, and contracts restricting executives and managerial personnel and staff.
100 Jackson & Coker, Inc. v. Hart, 405 S.E.2d 253, 255 (Ga. 1991); ROTHSTEIN ET AL.,
supra note 7, at 382.  In Jackson, the Georgia Supreme Court held that a statute requiring the
courts to enforce noncompetition agreements were unconstitutional and unenforceable
because the agreements were a restraint on trade and inconsistent with the state Constitution.
101 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.774a (West 2002) (specifically allowing an “agreement
or covenant which protects an employer’s reasonable competitive business interests and
expressly prohibits an employee from engaging in employment or a line of business after
termination of employment if the agreement or covenant is reasonable as to its duration,
geographical area, and the type of employment of line of business”).
102 MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-703 (2007) (specifically voiding “[a]ny contract by which
anyone is restrained from exercising a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind”).
103 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 53-9-11 (2004).  Although South Dakota “voids any contract
restraining exercise of a lawful profession, trade, or business,” the state “exempts noncompe-
tition agreements not exceeding two years after termination of employment.” Id. § 53-9-8,
§ 53-9-11.
104 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113(2)(b)-(d) (West 2003).
105 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2707 (2006).  Delaware does not recognize restrictive cove-
nants with respect to physicians.
106 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113(3) (West 2003).  Colorado does not recognize restric-
tive covenants generally and specifically with respect to physicians.
107 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:921(I) (Supp. 2009) (disallowing covenants “entered into by
an automobile salesman and his employer restraining him from selling automobiles”); id.
§ 23:921(C) (restricting agreements with former employees to two years).  The Louisiana
Legislature specifically addresses employees involved in computer programming in a sepa-
rate subsection. Id. § 23:921(G).
108 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 270; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113(3).
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The major factor motivating statutes protecting certain professions is public
policy.109  Simply, the public interest in retaining the services of a doctor or
specialist greatly outweighs the interest in protecting contract terms.110
III. NEVADA’S ACTION
For the past thirty years, the Nevada State Legislature has recognized
Nevada’s lack of an intermediary appellate court is problematic.111  Therefore,
Senate Bill 234 provided a remedy by seeking to “increase the number of
authored opinions for those cases that establish” Nevada common law.112
However, until such time, attorneys have the daunting task of convincing
judges of their positions and pressing for the Nevada Supreme Court to publish
favorable cases.113  This process is neither quick nor simple.114
However, this lack of controlling law, and the corresponding lack of stare
decisis, is positive in one regard.  Although Nevada law reflects a general ten-
dency to disfavor covenants not to compete,115 case law in this area has yet to
develop the concept completely.116  To date, the Nevada Supreme Court has
developed a reasonableness standard, evidenced judicial disfavor of covenants
that restrain trade, instituted business fines for enforcement of unreasonable
covenants, and completely disavowed assignments of non-competition agree-
ments absent adequate consideration and agreement to be bound.117  As case
law has not developed the concept completely, there is large latitude in shaping
the law.
Nevada demonstrates its disapproval of restrictive employment covenants
by a strict penalty of no more than $5,000 for anyone who “willfully does
anything intended to prevent any person who for any cause left or was dis-
charged from his or its employ from obtaining employment elsewhere in this
109 Grossman v. Columbine Med. Group, Inc., 12 P.3d 269, 273 (Colo. App. 1999).
110 Id.
111 SUPREME COURT OF NEV., REPORT TO THE 74TH REGULAR SESSION OF THE NEVADA
STATE LEGISLATURE, 2007, REGARDING THE CREATION OF THE NEVADA COURT OF APPEALS,
available at http://www.leg.state.nv.us/74th/Exhibits/Senate/JUD/SJUD855C.pdf [hereinaf-
ter REPORT TO LEGISLATURE]; S. 234, 2005 Leg., 74th Sess. (Nev. 2005) (effective Oct. 1,
2005).
112 REPORT TO LEGISLATURE, supra note 111, at 10.
113 See generally id.
114 See id.
115 NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.200 (2007).
116 See HD Supply Facilities Maint., Ltd. v. Bymoen, 210 P.3d 183 (Nev. 2009); Traffic
Control Servs., Inc. v. United Rentals Nw., Inc., 87 P.3d 1054 (Nev. 2004); Jones v. Deeter,
913 P.2d 1272 (Nev. 1996); Hansen v. Edwards, 426 P.2d 792 (Nev. 1967).
117 See generally NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.200 (2007) (imposing statutory fines); see also
HD Supply Facilities Maint., 210 P.3d at 188 (holding that nonassignability rule for cove-
nants not to compete in asset sale does not apply to statutory merger); Traffic Control Servs.,
Inc., 87 P.3d at 1060 (holding that covenants not to compete are not assignable absent
employee’s express consent and adequate consideration); Jones, 913 P.2d at 1275 (expres-
sing judicial disfavor of restrictive covenants and holding that a restrictive covenant will
only be upheld “if reasonably necessary to protect the business and goodwill of the
employer”); Hansen, 426 P.2d at 793 (holding that covenants not to compete are restraints
on trade and will not be enforced unless reasonable).
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State.”118  Although some statutory authority exists, there are only a few
Nevada cases on point: Hansen v. Edwards,119 Ellis v. McDaniel,120 Jones v.
Deeter,121 Camco, Inc. v. Baker,122 Traffic Control Services, Inc. v. United
Rentals Northwest, Inc.,123 and HD Supply Facilities Maintenance, Ltd. v.
Bymoen.124  Each case addresses an aspect of covenants not to compete that is
well-developed in other jurisdictions:  the reasonableness standard, public pol-
icy concerns, consideration for at-will employment, assignability of restrictive
covenants, and the status of non-competition covenants after company
mergers.125
In 1967, the Nevada Supreme Court adopted the reasonableness standard
to govern covenants not to compete.126  The Court in Hansen, applied the rea-
sonableness standard to geographical reach, duration, and scope, where a podi-
atrist’s post-employment covenant restricted practice by the former employee
within a 100 mile radius of the city, but did not include time limitation.127
After the former employee opened an office near the original office and lured
away 180 of the former employer’s patients, the Court limited the injunction to
prevent the former employee from competing within the city limits for one
year.128  In that case, the Court held that Nevada Revised Statutes section
613.200129 did not apply to persons who seek self-employment.130  Interest-
ingly, the Court did conduct a public policy analysis, but it tethered its analysis
to the “interest in protecting the freedom of persons to contract, and in enforc-
ing contractual rights and obligations.”131  This demonstrates the court’s reluc-
tance to change the terms of the agreement.  The lack of a time limitation
would normally invalidate the covenant for being unreasonable, but here, the
court intentionally protected the right to contract and did not reform the
contract.
Twelve years later the court reiterated the reasonableness standard under
similar circumstance and allowed the effect of restrictive covenants in the med-
ical profession.132  In Ellis, Ellis, an orthopedic surgeon, signed an employment
118 NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.200(1) (2007).
119 Hansen, 426 P.2d at 792.
120 Ellis v. McDaniel, 596 P.2d 222 (Nev. 1979).
121 Jones, 913 P.2d at 1272.
122 Camco, Inc. v. Baker, 936 P.2d 829 (Nev. 1997).
123 Traffic Control Servs., Inc. v. United Rentals Nw., Inc., 87 P.3d 1054 (Nev. 2004).
124 HD Supply Facilities Maint., Ltd. v. Bymoen, 210 P.3d 183 (Nev. 2009).
125 HD Supply Facilities Maint., 210 P.3d at 188 (declining to apply the rule of non-assign-
ability of covenants to corporate mergers); Traffic Control Servs., 87 P.3d at 1057 (discuss-
ing assignability of restrictive covenants); Camco, 936 P.2d at 831-32 (discussing restrictive
covenants in the context of at-will employment); Jones, 913 P.2d at 1275 (addressing public
policy concerns); Ellis, 596 P.2d at 224 (reaffirming the reasonableness standard); Hansen v.
Edwards, 426 P.2d 792, 793 (Nev. 1967) (adopting the reasonableness standard).
126 Hansen, 426 P.2d at 793.
127 Id. at 793-794.
128 Id. at 794.
129 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 613.200 (2007) (titled Prevention of employment of person
who has been discharged or who terminates employment unlawful; criminal and administra-
tive penalties; exception).
130 Hansen, 426 P.2d at 794.
131 Id. at 793.
132 Ellis v. McDaniel, 596 P.2d 222, 224 (Nev. 1979).
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contract with Elko Clinic, which included a covenant not to compete.133  In
relevant part, the covenant prohibited post-employment competition restricting
Ellis from practicing “medicine within a distance of five miles from the city
limits . . . for a period of two years from the termination date of his employ-
ment.”134  After four months, Ellis announced his intention to leave the Elko
Clinic at the end of his contract term and establish his own practice within the
city limits.135  Thus, Elko Clinic filed a motion for preliminary injunction.136
After the district court granted the injunction, Ellis appealed.137  Through this
set of facts, the Nevada Supreme Court held that “[t]he medical profession is
not exempt from a restrictive covenant provided the covenant meets the tests of
reasonableness.”138  The court further noted that although the covenant was
reasonable in its limits and Ellis could be restrained from opening a “general”
medical practice, “the public interest in retaining the services of the specialist is
greater than the interest in protecting the integrity of the contract . . . .”139
Thus, the Court modified the terms of the injunction to allow Ellis to perform
his specialty, but not to compete according to the terms of the agreement.140
The Nevada Supreme Court held that protecting legitimate business inter-
ests is an appropriate motive for a covenant not to compete.141  The Court has
further clarified the law by holding that restrictive covenants are not inherently
against public policy.142  In Jones, the Court declined to endorse the proposi-
tion that Nevada’s policy is “that restrictive covenants on employment are per
se invalid.”143  In Jones, the plaintiff alleged misappropriation of trade secrets
based on defendant having access to customer lists and possibly divulging pro-
prietary information about the light retrofitting trade.144  However, the court
held that the five-year duration was greater than necessary to protect Deeter’s
legitimate business interests, and it placed undue burdens on Jones.145  The
court concluded that the legislative history made it “clear that the Nevada Leg-
islature never intended NRS 613.200 to render post-employment restrictive
covenants void as against public policy.”146  Unlike Hansen, where the court
analyzed the reasonableness of duration and scope in relation to a party’s free-
dom to contract, Jones addressed the contract’s restrictions on duration and
scope in relation to a party’s legitimate business interests.147





138 Id. at 224.
139 Id. at 225.
140 Id.
141 See Jones v. Deeter, 913 P.2d 1272, 1275 (Nev. 1996) (holding that “[a] restrictive
covenant on employment will be upheld only if it is reasonably necessary to protect the
business and goodwill of the employer”).
142 Id. at 1274.
143 Id. at 1274.
144 Id. at 1273.
145 Id. at 1275.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 1274-75.
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As employment in Nevada is presumably at-will, continued employment
can be sufficient consideration for a covenant not to compete that is created
after an employee begins employment.148  In Camco, the court addressed cove-
nants not to compete in the context of at-will employment when Camco
appealed the lower court’s decision to deny a preliminary injunction enjoining
Baker from competing post-employment.149  The district court denied the
motion for want of sufficient consideration.150  On appeal, the Nevada Supreme
Court first addressed whether continued employment in an at-will state consti-
tuted sufficient consideration to support a covenant not to compete, and then
decided whether the terms of the covenant were reasonable.151  The Camco
court held that “[c]ontinued employment in an at-will state is sufficient consid-
eration for a post-hiring [non-competition] covenant.”152  The court reasoned
that the promise of initial hiring is equivalent to the promise of continued
employment, constituting sufficient consideration.153  Notwithstanding, the
court still denied the motion because the terms of the covenant were not reason-
able; the geographic restrictions extended further than necessary to protect the
employer’s interests.154
In Traffic Control Services, the Nevada Supreme Court held that rights
under a covenant not to compete are not assignable in a corporate sale; thus, a
new corporate owner needs to obtain the employee’s consent and pay separate
consideration.155  In that case, Burkhardt, a specialist in selling and renting
trench shoring equipment, worked for NES Trench Shoring (“NES”).156  After
being assured NES did not have plans to sell the business, Burkhardt signed a
contract that included a covenant not to compete with NES in exchange for
valid consideration.157  NES subsequently sold its corporate assets to United
Rentals Northwest (“United”).158  Prior to completing the sale, United
requested that NES’s employees sign new non-competition agreements, which
they would support with adequate consideration.159  Although Burkhardt and
others refused to sign the new agreement, he continued to work for United for a
period before United terminated his employment.160  Thereafter, Burkhardt
began work for United’s direct competitor.161  The court ultimately held that
the original covenant not to compete signed with NES was not assignable to
United absent a separate agreement with consideration.162
148 Camco, Inc. v. Baker, 936 P.2d 829, 832 (Nev. 1997).
149 Id. at 831.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 832.
152 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Sw. Gas Corp. v. Ahmad, 668 P.2d 261, 261 (Nev.
1983)).
153 Id.
154 Id. at 833.
155 Traffic Control Servs., Inc. v. United Rentals Nw., Inc., 87 P.3d 1054, 1057 (Nev. 2004).
156 Id. at 1055.
157 Id.




162 Id. at 1060.
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The most recent Nevada Supreme Court decision regarding covenants not
to compete is HD Supply Maintenance163 in which the court held that cove-
nants not to compete are enforceable by a successor corporation that acquires
non-competition agreements as part of a merger.164  HD Supply Facilities
Maintenance, Ltd. (HDS) was the new company created by two separate merg-
ers between Century Maintenance Supply, Inc. (Century), Hughes Supply, Inc.
and a subsidiary of Home Depot.165  When originally employed by Century,
Bymoen entered into non-solicitation, confidentiality, and non-competition
covenants.166  The contract did not contain an assignment clause.167  After the
final merger, Bymoen left the newly-formed HDS and immediately began to
work for a direct competitor.168  HDS sued Bymoen alleging breach of contract
and misappropriation of trade secrets, among other claims.169
After limiting Traffic Control to its facts, the Court distinguished between
contractual asset-purchase agreements and statutory mergers.170  The Nevada
Supreme Court explicated that while a contractual asset-purchase agreement
creates a new entity and thus a new employer, a statutory merger merely unites
two corporations into one single entity.171  The court opined that the holding in
Traffic Control did not apply in the context of a corporate merger172 and it
declined to accept Bymoen’s argument advocating adoption of Vermont
Supreme Court’s reasoning.173
IV. THE NEED FOR A NEW STANDARD:  A PROPOSAL
Nevada is in the perfect position to make forward-looking laws, protect its
business and workforce, and help remedy the state’s economic concerns.  The
evolution of employment in the United States has taken a new turn.  Scientific
progress has put a man on the moon, a computer in two-thirds of American
homes, and cell phones at the ears of a majority of teenagers.174  Since achiev-
163 HD Supply Facilities Maint., Ltd. v. Bymoen, 210 P.3d 183 (Nev. 2009).  In HD Supply
Facilities, the court answered three questions certified by the federal district court. Id. at
184.
164 Id. at 188.





170 Id. at 186.
171 Id. at 186-87.
172 Id. at 187-88.
173 Id. at 188, n.4 (“[T]he Vermont Supreme Court concluded that an acquiring corporation
in a stock purchase transaction could not enforce a former employee’s noncompetition cove-
nant under Vermont’s now-superseded merger statute, which provided that upon an asset
sale, merger, or consolidation of different corporate entities, the acquiring corporation ‘shall
possess all the rights, privileges and benefits of the original corporation properly exercisable
under the laws of [Vermont].’”  (second alteration in original) (quoting Smith, Bell &
Hauck, Inc. v. Cullins, 183 A.2d 528 (Vt. 1962))).  Additionally, the court did not address
the implications of the holding based “on the type of covenant—whether one of noncompeti-
tion, nonsolicitation, or confidentiality.” Id. at 188.
174 Barnaby J. Feder, Information On-Ramp Crosses a Digital Divide, N.Y. TIMES, July 8,
2003, at C1; John Noble Wilford, A Powdery Surface Is Closely Explored, N.Y. TIMES, July
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ing statehood over one hundred years ago, Nevada’s economy relied strongly
on silver production.175  More recently, development of the gaming and tour-
ism industries has sustained the state’s tax base and allowed Nevada to support
the sudden influx of new residents.176
The current economic crisis has not spared Nevada.  With the highest fore-
closure rates in the nation,177 Nevada is not immune to the economic chal-
lenges the current recession presents.  Education, healthcare, and state welfare
programs already have suffered losses and the current plight has not escaped
the attention of state legislators.178  With Nevada’s recent unemployment levels
reaching values last seen in the 1980s,179 the state cannot sit with its fingers
crossed waiting for the relief proposed by the $700 billion economic bailout.180
Nevada is in a position to insulate itself, at least in the area of employment.181
Luckily, Nevada has hindsight in its favor because lawmakers have the benefit
of viewing the past successes and failures of other states in determining new
law in the employment arena.  Any new legislation could reflect modern trends
in employment law, address knowledge-based fields, while protecting busi-
nesses, employees, and Nevada’s economic stability.
Essentially, Nevada has hit a brick wall.  The housing and employment
bubble has reached its current maximum capacity.182  Likewise, investors have
all but given up on Nevada as the new “it” location.183  Additionally, consider-
ing the current budget crisis and serious cuts in education funding,
“[b]usinesses are choosing not to relocate [to Nevada] because [Nevada is] not
21, 1969, at A1; CTIA, Teenagers:  A Generation Unplugged, http://www.ctia.org/advocacy/
research/index.cfm/AID/11483 (last visited Feb. 28, 2010).
175 THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA (6th ed. 2008), available at http://www.encyclopedia.
com/topic/Nevada.aspx.
176 STATE GAMING CONTROL BD. & NEV. GAMING COMM’N, GAMING REGULATION IN
NEVADA 10 (2006), available at http://gaming.nv.gov/documents/pdf/gaming_regulation_
nevada.pdf [hereinafter GAMING REGULATION IN NEVADA] Nevada’s economy is largely
fueled by gambling taxes, and gaming is the “primary economic industry in the State of
Nevada.”
177 Steve Green, Nevada’s Foreclosure Rate Tops Nation Once Again, LAS VEGAS SUN,
Feb. 12, 2009, http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2009/feb/12/foreclosures; Mark Huffman,
May Foreclosure Filing Rate Highest Ever, CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM, June 15, 2008, http://
www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2008/06/foreclosures_may.html.
178 Associated Press, 2009 Nevada Legislature Opens amid Budget Debate, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Feb. 2, 2009, http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/2009/feb/02/nv-nevada-
legislature-020209/.
179 Sean Whaley, Nevada’s Jobless Rate Reaches 7.3 Percent, Highest Since ‘85, LAS
VEGAS REV.- J., Oct. 21, 2008, at 1A, available at http://www.lvrj.com/news/31560884.
html.
180 Id.; Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat.
3765.
181 Unlike other states that have a significant body of law that prevents easy adaptation,
Nevada’s lack of law works to its advantage.  Specifically, it allows Nevada to create a
statutory solution that would attract more businesses, which will in turn create more jobs.
182 Housing Predictor, Nevada, http://www.housingpredictor.com/nevada.html (last visited
Feb. 28, 2010).
183 See Hot Spots Cold Spots, http://money.cnn.com/popups/2006/fortune/invguide_real
estate/4.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2010).
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investing enough in . . . education.”184  Nevada cannot take drastic measures,
because such a huge gamble could result in a catastrophic situation.  Instead,
adopting small changes to its legal structure could benefit the state without
running the risks that accompany more drastic measures.
Nevada needs to invest in its future by drawing new businesses into the
state to increase capital investments.  Likewise, the state needs to protect its
most valuable human resources, by legally insulating them from any retaliation
or intimidation tactics by businesses.  This proposal only addresses one possi-
ble course of action.  However, this is the best course of action once Nevada
considers the successes and failures of other states.  As they have time and
again, Nevada legislators should strive to balance the needs of every constituent
in the state.
Nevada lawmakers have the opportunity to shape balanced laws that will
continue to attract business to the state while also protecting the workforce.
Although Delaware has traditionally been the state of choice for business incor-
poration, Nevada’s corporate tax structure is particularly appealing to new busi-
nesses.185  Perhaps the most appealing feature is that Nevada businesses do not
pay any corporate tax on profits or franchise ownership.186  Additionally,
Nevada law provides greater protection to officers of limited liability compa-
nies by making their asset valuation decisions final.187  Therefore, Nevada has
the strong potential to attract new businesses while simultaneously protecting
workers.
The Nevada Supreme Court’s most recent decision regarding covenants
not to compete illustrates that the need for new law or judicial interpretation
has not diminished.  As the court aptly noted, the analysis does not cease upon
a finding of covenant validity, but rather must extend to statutory applicabil-
ity.188  Unlike other states that may struggle with of the weight of judicial pre-
cedent and conflicting statutes affecting the issue, Nevada does not have these
barriers.189  Nevada is uniquely positioned to create new laws that do not con-
flict with existing laws.  Thus, Nevada legislators can easily create laws that
reflect the new and modern trend of technologically-based business.  When
developing new law in this area, Nevada legislators should anticipate decisions
made by the judiciary, who will ultimately have the responsibility to interpret
those laws.
184 Why Nevada Education Matters for Job Creation, KTNV.COM, April 13, 2009, http://
www.ktvn.com/Global/story.asp?S=10176665; see also Legislatures Balances Budget with
Big Cuts, Line of Credit, KVBC.COM, Dec. 9, 2008, http://www.kvbc.com/Global/
story.asp?S=9480464 (stating that the Nevada Legislature approved $5 million budget cut
for the Millennium Scholarship Fund for 2008 and that absent further action, funds will run
out by 2015).
185 Nevada Corporation, http://www.quickmba.com/law/corporation/nevada/ (last visited
Feb. 28, 2010).  Recent changes have put Nevada in a more advantageous situation.
186 Nevada Secretary of State, Why Incorporate in Nevada?, http://nvsos.gov/index.aspx?
page=152 (last visited Feb. 28, 2010).
187 Id.
188 HD Supply Facilities Maint. Ltd. v. Bymoen, 210 P.3d 183, 187-88 (Nev. 2009).
189 The limited case law in this area enables the court to “to stand by and adhere to deci-
sions and not disturb what is settled.” In re Osborne, 76 F.3d 306, 309 (9th Cir. 1996).
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Most importantly, legislators must consider balancing the interests of both
employers and employees, and the intricate dynamics of Nevada’s economy.190
Some of these unique characteristics include a strong union presence represent-
ing and negotiating a majority of employment contracts, the relatively small
number of technology-based businesses as compared to a large labor force,
Nevada’s ability, or inability to sustain a large business influx, and the concen-
tration of urban-based jobs in small pockets scattered throughout the state.191
To balance interests while still drawing businesses into the state, Nevada
should adopt a standard similar to Colorado’s.192  Following this model,
Nevada would simultaneously protect employers and limit restraint of trade by
drawing distinctions between restraint of trade and trade secrets, specialized
training, and executives.193  Adopting a Colorado-type standard is advanta-
geous to Nevada for three reasons.  First, the new standard would leave all
existing Nevada precedent intact.194  Second, Colorado’s controlling statute
successfully balances the interests of employers and employees by protecting
business investments and employee mobility.195  Lastly, looking at major
industries, Colorado’s economic makeup is more similar to Nevada’s than the
economy of California or other states with a pro-employee approach.196
Language similar to the Colorado statute would expand and elaborate on
existing law, thereby creating a more predictable framework for everyone
involved.  Adopting a statute similar to Colorado’s would not require overturn-
ing any existing precedent and the statute would not conflict with any existing
laws.197  Similar to Nevada’s existing statute, Colorado generally voids any
contract that restrains trade.198  Likewise, Colorado’s statute encompasses
rather than contradicts the concepts that exist in Nevada law:  a reasonableness
standard, disfavor of covenants that restrain trade, fines for businesses enforc-
190 COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 175.
191 Id.; Nevada Union Facts, http://www.unionfacts.com/states/state.cfm?state=NV (last
visited Feb. 28, 2010).
192 See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113 (West 2003) (titled “Unlawful to intimidate
worker—agreement not to compete”).
193 Id. at § 8-2-113(2)(a)-(d).
194 Compare id., with Traffic Control Servs. Inc. v. United Rentals Nw., Inc., 87 P.3d 1054,
1060 (Nev. 2004) (“Covenants not to compete are personal in nature and therefore are not
assignable absent the employee’s express consent.”), and Jones v. Deeter, 913 P.2d 1272,
1275 (Nev. 1996) (“A restrictive covenant on employment will be upheld only if it is reason-
ably necessary to protect the business and goodwill of the employer.”), and Hansen v.
Edwards, 426 P.2d 792, 793 (Nev. 1967) (“The medical profession is not exempt from a
restrictive covenant provided the covenant meets the tests of reasonableness.”).
195 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113(2) (West 2003) (voiding covenants not to compete
except for those involving the sale of business, trade secrets, training expenses, and high-
level employees).
196 Colorado’s major industries include agriculture, scientific technologies, financial ser-
vices, information technology, and manufacturing.  Colorado Office of Economic Develop-
ment and International Trade, Major Industries and Employers, http://www.colorado.gov/cs/
Satellite/OEDIT/OEDIT/1167928218432 (last visited Feb. 28, 2010).
197 See supra note 194 and accompanying text. Compare COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-
113, with NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.200 (2007).
198 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113(2).
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ing such covenants, and disallowing assignment of non-competition agreements
absent adequate consideration and agreement to be bound.199
Legislative clarification would allow businesses to feel comfortable relo-
cating businesses to Nevada, because it would create a predictable outcome
easing the fears of employees agreeing to non-competition agreements.
Accordingly, the statute would aid the judiciary in its decision-making
processes because the legislative intent would be clear from the statue’s plain
language rather than legislative history.  The adjudication process becomes less
daunting for employers and employees and courts will be less hesitant to make
decisions that could restrain trade.
A. Blue-Pencil Doctrine
On the same note, concerns of courts “blue-penciling” agreements would
dissipate.  Blue “is believed to be the color pencil used by editors in the past,”
hence the term “blue-penciling.”200  Many times when a state’s law is unclear,
the judiciary employs the blue-pencil doctrine.201  Blue-penciling refers to the
“judicial standard for deciding whether to invalidate the whole contract or only
the offending words.”202  Generally, there are “three schools of thought” when
it comes to state use of the blue-pencil doctrine:  “all or nothing,” “blue pencil,”
or “partial enforcement.”203  The “all or nothing” voids the offending covenant
in its entirety, whereas “blue-penciling” strikes the offending clause and
enforces all other reasonable contract terms.204  The last “school” of “partial
enforcement” allows the judiciary to re-write contract terms.205  Therefore,
strict blue-penciling allows the judiciary to strike contract clauses “by running
a blue pencil through them, as opposed to changing, adding, or rearranging
words.”206
Courts are at liberty and obligated to blue-pencil contractual provisions
that contradict public policy.207  That flexibility allows courts to either strike
only the unreasonable clauses, or actually modify the agreement to encompass
which the the parties “should have” agreed.208  This authority raises concerns
about the freedom to contract, and overreaching of judicial authority.209  Fur-
thermore, states that allow blue-penciling give employers no incentive to avoid
199 See  supra note 125 and accompanying text.
200 Kenneth R. Swift, Void Agreements, Knocked-Out Terms, and Blue Pencils:  Judicial
and Legislative Handling of Unreasonable Terms in Noncompete Agreements, 24 HOFSTRA
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 223, 247 n.136 (2007).
201 Pivateau, supra note 12, at 673.
202 Id. at 681(quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 183 (8th ed. 2004)).
203 Id. at 682.
204 Id.  Arizona is an “all or nothing” state and disallows any form of blue-penciling. See
e.g. Valley Med. Specialists v. Farber, 982 P.2d 1277, 1286 (Ariz. 1999) (“Where the sever-
ability of the agreement is not evident from the contract itself, the court cannot create a new
agreement for the parties to uphold the contract.”) (quoting Olliver/Pilcher Ins. v. Daniels,
715 P.2d 1218, 1221 (Ariz. 1986)).
205 Pivateau, supra note 12, at 682.
206 Id. at 681(quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 183 (8th ed. 2004)).
207 Id. at 706.
208 Id. at 673.
209 Id. at 686 n.73.
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overreaching and restrict employees who do not litigate the reasonableness of
the provisions.210  By limiting judicial blue-penciling, states significantly dis-
courage employer overreaching and create stability for employees.211
By adopting Colorado’s clear language, Nevada would avoid the trap of
judicial blue-penciling.  Furthermore, the Legislature could include a subsec-
tion disallowing judicial interference and voiding either the offending contrac-
tual provisions or the entire agreement.
B. Trade Secrets
Adopting a statute based on Colorado’s statute would balance legitimate
business interests while simultaneously protecting workers in both knowledge
and labor-based fields.  Unlike many other states’ statutes, Colorado’s statute
carefully carves out exceptions to address public policy concerns.212  The Colo-
rado statute protects employee interests overall; however, it allows minor
exceptions to protect employers’ business investments.213  These exceptions
are not unreasonable or overreaching in either direction because they protect
the interests of the employer with only minimal burden on the employee.  First,
the statute allows “any contract for the protection of trade secrets.”214  Two key
characteristics of creative skills-based or knowledge-based businesses are trade
secrets and the business’ desire to protect its intangible assets.215  Colorado’s
statute addresses these key concerns of businesses.  By protecting business
investments in intellectual property, the statute creates an incentive for busi-
nesses to incorporate there.216  However, this is not to suggest that the covenant
need not be narrowly tailored and reasonable.217  For example, in Management
Recruiters of Boulder, Inc. v. Miller,218 Management Recruiters sued Miller for
a violation of a covenant not to compete.219  The Colorado Court of Appeals
held that the one-year restriction was narrowly tailored, reasonable, and
210 Id. at 689.
211 Deutsche Post Global Mail, Ltd. v. Conrad, 292 F. Supp. 2d 748, 754 n.3 (D. Md. 2003)
(“In my view to permit blue penciling encourages an employer to impose an overly broad
restrictive covenant, knowing that if the covenant is challenged by an employee the only
consequence suffered by the employer will be to have a court write a narrower restriction for
it.  This appears to me to be extremely unfair and contrary to sound public policy.”).
212 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113(2) (West 2003).
213 Id.
214 Id. § 8-2-113(2)(b).
215 Bishara, supra note 1, at 295.
216 Note:  A noncompetition contract clause is independent of any patent assignment clause
generally included in contracts.  Common law rule requires employees hired to make an
invention to assign his employer any patent obtained.  United States v. Dubilier Condenser
Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 187-88 (1933).  However, when the employee is not specifically hired
to invent products, but comes across an invention in the normal course of his employment,
then the employee is the patent holder, but must allow the employer to use the patent without
having to pay royalties. Id.  Nevada law is pro-employer in this regard, giving intellectual
property rights to the employer when an “employee during the course and scope of the
employment that relates directly to work performed during the course and scope of the
employment” creates “any patentable invention or trade secret.” NEV. REV. STAT. § 600.500
(2007).
217 Mgmt. Recruiters of Boulder, Inc. v. Miller, 762 P.2d 763, 765-66 (Colo. App. 1988).
218 Mgmt. Recruiters of Boulder, Inc. v. Miller, 762 P.2d 763.
219 Id. at 764.
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enforceable.220  The covenant “prohibited Miller from contacting any ‘candi-
date’ with whom he had actual contact during his final year in Recruiters’
employ” thus “prevent[ing] the misappropriation of trade secrets by Miller.”221
It is important to note the contrast between California and Colorado
respecting covenants not to compete.  Despite adopting laws favoring employ-
ees, California’s intellectual property market has flourished with companies
like Apple, Google, and Sun Microsystems choosing to locate their headquar-
ters there.222  Colorado’s main business exports, beef and mineral ore, are more
akin to Nevada’s main export, minerals, both of which are agricultural.223
Although it is not completely unreasonable to hope that Nevada will attract
more businesses like California;224 however, Nevada is more likely to continue
to develop like Colorado with mainly rural/urban hybrid cities and small pock-
ets of ultra-urbanization.225
Further, commentators have recognized the monkey wrench that the
internet throws into the equation by effectively eliminating all geographic
boundaries and allowing for a global customer base.226  Consequently, geo-
graphic restrictions are ineffective and courts will invariably hold any cove-
nants with expansive geographic limitations unreasonable.227  Therefore,
narrow exceptions force businesses to draft covenants reasonably and narrowly,
thus limiting their force.228  Specifically, this exception ensures employer pro-
tection while the general reasonableness standard protects employees as
well.229
220 Id. at 766.
221 Id.
222 California’s “business climate has nurtured Google, Apple, Hewlett-Packard, Facebook,
Twitter, Disney, Cisco, Intel, eBay, YouTube, MySpace, the Gap and countless other com-
panies.”  Michael Grunwald, The End of California?  Dream On!, TIME, Nov. 2, 2009, at 28.
223 Nevada’s economy largely is fueled by gambling taxes, and gaming is the “primary
economic industry in Nevada.” GAMING REGULATION IN NEVADA, supra note 176, at 10;
COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 175 (Nevada is the United States leading producer of
gold, silver, and mercury).  Colorado’s main exports are beef and mineral ore.  U.S. Census
Bureau, State Exports for Colorado, http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/state/
data/co.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2010).
224 California businesses are not relocating “to Nevada or anywhere else; . . . . fewer than
one-tenth of 1% of [California’s] jobs leave the state each year.”  Grunwald, supra note 222,
at 28.
225 Due to Nevada’s desert climate and the lack of available water, widespread urban
growth is unlikely. See CHRISTINA ROESSLER, PROGRESSIVE LEADERSHIP ALLIANCE OF
NEV., WHERE DOES IT START?  WHERE WILL IT END? 2-3 (2006), available at http://
www.westernresourceadvocates.org/media/pdf/NV-water-pipeline-report.pdf.
226 Barbara Pellow, The E-Commerce Success Model . . . Supply Chain Management:
Great Lakes Companies Embraces Change, DIGITAL OUTPUT, Apr. 2003, available at http://
www.digitaloutput.net/content/contentct.asp?p=348.
227 Joan T.A. Gabel & Nancy R. Mansfield, The Information Revolution and Its Impact on
the Employment Relationship:  An Analysis of the Cyberspace Workplace, 40 AM. BUS. L.J.
301, 323 (Dec. 2002).
228 Id.
229 Id.
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C. Education and Training
The second relevant subsection of the Colorado statute allows employers
to invest in employee education and training to promote their business without
fear of losing their investment when employees leave to work for a competi-
tor.230  In pertinent part, the subsection provides “for recovery of the expense
of educating and training an employee who has served an employer for a period
of less than two years.”231  The two-year window is critical, especially for
existing Nevada businesses in Clark and Washoe Counties.   Although most
unskilled service positions, such as housekeeping or kitchen helpers, do not
require additional training,232 other hospitality positions may require additional
education in hotel management, managerial systems, internet technology, or
gaming development.233
The two-year limitation encourages rapid development in these areas by
allowing employers to recoup educational expenses that will remain current in
two years.  Nonetheless, this durational restriction is probably more beneficial
in computer related businesses where the rapid growth of knowledge makes
new technologies obsolete within days or months of conception rather than
years.234  Colorado’s statute reflects the need to protect business investment in
employee training by requiring that the contract contain a provision proscribing
reimbursement for training expenses.235  Protecting knowledge-based busi-
nesses would enable Nevada to make a significant contribution to the nation’s
economic recovery.
Furthermore, Colorado’s stance on covenants not to compete in the “at-
will context” of employment comports better with earlier Nevada decisions
than the Camco holding.  Recently the Lucht’s Concrete Pumping, Inc. v.
Horner236 court held that Colorado does not recognize continued at-will
employment to be sufficient consideration for a covenant not to compete.237  In
that case, Horner executed a post-employment non-competition agreement but
was not given a “pay increase, promotion, or additional benefits in considera-
230 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113(2)(c) (West 2003).
231 Id.
232 Although service positions may entail extended training, continuing professional educa-
tion is more prevalent in heavily academic fields.
233 Division of Educational Outreach, Business and Professional Development, http://edout-
reach.unlv.edu/catalog/business_professional_programs.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2010).
For example, the University of Nevada, Las Vegas offers Continuing Education Units in
business essentials, and internet design and technology, among others. Id.
234 Jim Pinto, Product Development Speed in the Internet Age, CONTROLS INTELLIGENCE &
PLANT SYSTEMS REPORT, June 2000, available at http://www.jimpinto.com/writings/devel-
opment.html (“In the last century, new products took 3 years to develop.  In the Internet age
Time is critical and clearly a competitive weapon.  With accelerating technology, some prod-
ucts are obsolete within months.”).
235 See Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Sandvick, 732 F.2d 783, 788 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding inap-
plicable the statute allowing contractual provision for recovery of training expenses where
employee serves employer for less than two years where the employment agreement did not
contain a provision requiring reimbursement of training expenses).
236 Lucht’s Concrete Pumping, Inc. v. Horner, No. 08CA0936, 2009 WL 1621306 (Colo.
App. June 11, 2009).
237 Id. at *1.
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tion of his new commitment.”238  Relying heavily on basic contract principles
and the definition of consideration, the court rejected the defendant’s argument
that continued employment constituted sufficient consideration.239  This rea-
soning in similar to the reasoning of the Nevada Supreme Court in Hansen,
protecting the right to contract.240
The Colorado’s statute also protects employer interests by providing an
exception for “executive and management personnel and officers and employ-
ees who constitute professional staff to executive and management person-
nel.”241  This is especially relevant in light of current bank mergers and
acquisitions, where the employees and secrets of two different employers
become employees and secrets of the same company.242  These protectable
secrets may include proprietary knowledge of customer lists243 and other infor-
mation that executives develop in the course of their employment, such as cus-
tomer relations.244
Interestingly, this subsection fits perfectly with the reasoning of the
Nevada Supreme Court in Hansen that non-competition restrictions do not
apply to people who intend to be self-employed.245  Those professionals who
advance to executive positions are able to be and are in some ways self-
employed because of their independence through connections and experience.
In Nevada, professionals have the opportunity to obtain future employment in
diverse fields and thus the statute is not necessary to provide protection to
employers.246
D. Specific Professions
The final relevant subsection of the statute voids covenants not to compete
between and among physicians.247  The public policy concerns here are clear
and are particularly apparent in light of the Kansas case, Graham v. Cirroco,
discussed above.248  However, the Kansas court was quick to note that although
the agreement was facially reasonable, its effect was unreasonable in light of
238 Id. at *2.
239 Id.
240 In Hansen, the court’s final analysis pivoted around the “interest in protecting the free-
dom of persons to contract, and in enforcing contractual rights and obligations.”  Hansen v.
Edwards, 426 P.2d 792, 793 (Nev. 1967).
241 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113(2)(d) (West 2003).
242 See Eric Dash & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Government Seizes WaMu and Sells Some
Assets, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/26/
business/26wamu.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all.
243 See Transcript of Motion Hearing, Mutual of Omaha Bank v. Huntington, 597 F. Supp.
2d 1213, passim (D. Nev. 2009) (No. 2:08-CV-1274-PMP-LRL).
244 NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.200(4)(b) (2007).
245 Hansen v. Edwards, 426 P.2d 792, 794 (Nev. 1967).
246 The Hansen court specifically states that the Nevada statute “concerns only persons who
seek employment with someone else, not those who intend self-employment.” Id.  If those
who reach upper echelons of management and control in corporations are intending to be
self-employed, then it is reasonably implied the Nevada statute will not apply or protect
employers.
247 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113(3) (West 2003).
248 Graham v. Cirocco, 69 P.3d 194, 200 (Kan. Ct. App. 2003).
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public policy.249  It is apparent that the restriction in Graham was unreasonable
because prohibiting practice within twenty-five miles of any hospital or prac-
tice for two-years created a virtual monopoly on the doctor’s specialty.250
Moreover, in Ellis the court made clear that voiding covenants that limit com-
petition in medical specialties serves the public interest.251  This provision is
especially significant to Nevada because of the shortage of doctors, nurses, and
other medical professionals.252  Additionally, in light of the recent events
within the medical community, any monopolization of any specialty would be
detrimental to the public health.253  Protecting physicians would encourage
more doctors to relocate to Nevada by reducing the risk of possible bad partner-
ships and litigation based on non-competition agreements.
Additionally, this subsection could be modified to include attorneys.
Other states classify lawyers as protected professionals because they recognize
the public benefit in allowing clients to choose freely their legal representa-
tion.254  One logical argument supporting this policy is that loyalty does not
naturally pass to the firm but rather to the individual attorney involved and
restricting the client’s choice to one firm is beyond the reach of the state’s
power.
E. Nevada, California, and Colorado
Although Nevada traditionally looks to its neighbor, California, when
adopting new laws,255 Nevada’s economic and social composition is more akin
to Colorado than California.  As mentioned above, Nevada’s silver mining is
more akin to Colorado’s agricultural exports than California’s Silicon Valley.
Remarkably, Silicon Valley produces the majority of California’s primary
export—computers and electronics—despite being a small pocket of industry
situated in Northern California.256  Thus, although California’s pro-employee
249 Id.
250 Id. at 199, 200.
251 Ellis v. McDaniel, 596 P.2d 222, 225 (Nev. 1979).
252 Lawrence Mower, Doctor Shortage:  Help Sought South of Border, LAS VEGAS REV.-J.,
Jan. 22, 2007, http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj_home/2007/Jan-22-Mon-2007/news/1207
1369.html.
253 Annette Wells, Public Health Crisis:  Insurers Drop Clinics, Doctors, LAS VEGAS REV.-
J., May 28, 2008, http://www.lvrj.com/news/17079896.html.  One such medical crisis is the
recent Hepatitis C outbreak springing from Endoscopy Center of Nevada’s reuse of contami-
nated syringes, which put many patients at risk for disease.
254 See Cattani et al., supra note 42, § 2.1.4(d).
255 STATE BAR OF NEVADA, 1 NEVADA CIVIL PRACTICE MANUAL § 1.03 (2006) (“California
law has been a prominent source of Nevada law since the inception of statehood.”); see, e.g.,
Clark v. Lubritz, 944 P.2d 861, 865 n.6 (Nev. 1997) (“Nevada’s statute on punitive damages
is a verbatim copy of the California punitive damages statute. . . . [W]e have adhered to the
rule of statutory interpretation that when a statute is derived from a sister state, it is presuma-
bly adopted with the construction given it by the highest court of the sister state.” (alteration
in original) (quoting Craigo v. Circus-Circus Enters., 786 P.2d 22, 23 (Nev. 1990))).
256 CalChamber, Trade Statistics, http://www.calchamber.com/BusinessResources/
InternationalResources/AllAboutInternationalTrade/Pages/TradeStatistics.aspx (last visited
Feb. 28, 2010) (“California is the number one exporter in the nation of computers, electronic
products, and sales of food and kindred products.  Computers and electronic products are
California’s top export, accounting for 42 percent of all the state’s exports.”).
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laws protect employees in all fields, intellectual fields are being most greatly
affected.257
Although Colorado law is a sound resource for Nevada legislators, any
new legislation must consider Nevada’s unique economy.  When adopting for-
ward-looking laws, Nevada legislators’ foremost concern should be striking a
balance that considers and addresses the interests of both employers and
employees.  In a state built on the shoulders of its workforce, it would be irre-
sponsible to create laws that do not protect the state’s workforce which is
arguably the state’s most valuable asset.  However, protecting employees does
not require the state to value employees over employers.  Accordingly, the leg-
islature can recognize the symbiotic relationship between employers and
employees with new legislation.  As neither consideration trumps the other,
legislators should weigh each group’s interests and factor and incorporate them
into any law.
Although covenants not to compete are a restraint on trade, not all are
unreasonable or unnecessary.258  A balanced agreement begins with drafting a
covenant where both sides have equal bargaining power, responsibilities, and
rights.259  Thus, employers should not be able to economically strong-arm
employees into these agreements, and employees should not be allowed to ben-
efit at the expense of a company’s investment in their development.  Although
California has extremely pro-employee laws, the state’s reasoning reflects the
state’s characteristics and is beneficial for its residents.  Commentators looking
at California reason that any restraint on trade that limits freedom of competi-
tion and an employee’s right to move between jobs retards the free-flow of
information.260  The free-flow of ideas and knowledge allows technology and
society to develop at a rapid pace.261  However, despite California’s success,
this free-flow does not need to come at complete expense of business owners.
In a capitalist society, all sides can mutually benefit.262  Legal protections must
reflect a society’s values.  Therefore, Nevada should allow businesses to pro-
tect “its investment in human resources, customer relationships, and confiden-
tial business information” to ensure its “continued economic viability.”263
Legislators should extend this legal protection to allow full mobility of employ-
ees.  Accordingly, businesses should not be able to trap employees into contin-
ued employment by holding a non-competition agreement over their heads;
employees should be allowed to seek better work when conditions are less than
ideal.  Likewise, businesses should be able to recoup their economic invest-
ments in employee training while that training is still relevant.  A solution that
257 Bishara, supra note 1, at 307-08.
258 See, e.g., Camco, Inc. v. Baker, 936 P.2d 829, 832-833 (Nev. 1997).
259 See Pivateau, supra note 12, at 675 (noting that employers must carefully consider the
terms and conditions of employee contracts, so as to correctly value and draft the
agreement).
260 Bishara, supra note 1, at 307-08.
261 See id. (arguing that the success of Silicon Valley, California and its “high velocity”
labor market are a result of the state’s ban on non-competes).
262 See generally Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its
Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, reprinted in SCOTT B. RAE & KENMAN L. WONG,
BEYOND INTEGRITY 131 (2d ed. 2004).
263 Gabel & Mansfield, supra note 227, at 321.
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values organic development and respect, engages both employers and employ-
ees.  Consequently, employees would take ownership of their labor and pro-
duce better work, while employers’ investment in human capital would
generate development at exponential rates.  Adopting these principles will dis-
solve, or at least alleviate to a non-crippling degree, the culture of fear sur-
rounding non-competition agreements.
Regulation of restrictive covenants also serves the public interest.  By pro-
viding reasonable protection to employers and employees, the public interest
gains access to higher levels of specialization and expertise.  Capitalism is
founded on competition which keeps businesses “focused on providing the best
quality product or service,” “leads to the development of new products and
innovative technologies,” and ultimately “provide[s] selection” and lower cost
goods to the consumer.264  Therefore, the very nature of competition will
encourage consumers to seek out the best physician, lawyer, contractor, or
other creative mind, and thus those professionals will have to produce increas-
ingly better service to enjoy business success.265  Regulation of covenants not
to compete helps prevent monopolies and drives innovation forward.  Although
it is imprudent to expect utopian results, Nevada would be irresponsible if it
failed to push for positive change in novel ways.
A new statute must retain the underlying foundation of a contractual
agreement, including the presence of consideration.  Additionally, covenants
should avoid boilerplate clauses and narrowly tailor each covenant to the par-
ticular employee based on his credentials, expertise, position, and needs.
Although this increases the initial burden on employers, it would reduce the
amount of litigation and frustration in the event of termination.  Consequently,
employees will not fear leaving their jobs, employers will not fear judicial blue-
penciling of otherwise reasonable contract terms, and future employers will
seek additional expertise without unfairly benefiting from other company’s
investment.266
Unlike most states, Nevada’s statutory solution must address the abun-
dance of unions.267  Although many employment contracts are boilerplate and
pre-negotiated with union officials, this statute will still prove to be beneficial
for intermediate managerial positions.268
Most of the time, employers will not deem it beneficial to litigate losing a
labor-based service to a competitor.  Rather, these “collateral losses” are typical
in the hotel and casino industries.269  Notably, this change would significantly
affect only the two most urban of Nevada’s thirteen counties, Washoe and
264 Dakota State University, Center for TechnoEntrepreneurism, http://www.ct.dsu.edu/
laic.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2010).
265 Id.
266 Pivateau, supra note 12, at 705-06.
267 See UnionFacts.com, supra note 191.
268 Id.; Musicians Union of Las Vegas, Local No. 369 v. Del E. Webb Corp. 736 F.2d 1388,
1391 (9th Cir. 1984), reh’g denied, amended, and superseded 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2409 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Consequently, union members necessarily forfeit the power individu-
ally to negotiate the terms and conditions of their employment.”).
269 Press Release, Hotel-Online.com, EI-AH&MA / KPMG Study Finds Hotel Industry
Turnover Rates Continue to Climb (April 1998), available at http://www.hotel-online.com/
News/PressReleases1998_2nd/EITurnoverRatesClimb_May98.html.
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Clark.270  Nonetheless, the majority of Nevada’s land continues to be rural and
consists of low-populations or clusters of people.271  Rural counties contribute
more land than population to the state.272  However, if the proposed statute has
the anticipated effect, then rural areas should realize population growth and
increased economic significance as a result of increased business.
CONCLUSION
Employment situations become especially troublesome when restrictive
covenants prevent employees seeking career advancement from searching out
new employment, or employers from hiring qualified applicants.  Essentially,
covenants not to compete create a stalemate.  Employers fear discharging
employees, employees fear leaving, and future employers fear potential law-
suits.  However, Nevada can avoid or at least significantly alleviate this predic-
ament by adopting new laws governing covenants not to compete.  Most states
prohibit assigning employment contracts, including any restrictive covenants
contained within them.273  It is imperative for Nevada to develop law in this
area because Nevada’s continued economic growth depends on protecting its
workforce while simultaneously encouraging new businesses to incorporate in
Nevada. Thus, Nevada should look to both California and Colorado when
crafting a statue uniquely tailored to its economy.
California’s underlying policy and demonstrated success should inform
Nevada’s decision making process.  Despite extremely pro-employee laws,
California has experienced success in emerging markets such as computers and
electronics.274  It subscribes to the reasoning advanced by some academics that
laws protecting employee mobility force employers to move quickly to reap the
benefits of their investment into human capital275 and result in more rapid
development of innovation.276  Regardless of the theory’s validity, California
has done well for itself.277  Although Nevada’s laws mirror California’s, its
economy bears a closer resemblance to Colorado economy than it does to Cali-
fornia.  Hence, Colorado’s statutes incorporate effective strategies for a similar
economy.  First, both Nevada and Colorado are at-will states.278  Second, both
states rely largely on tourism and agriculture to generate tax revenue.  Finally,
270 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:  2004-2005 at
20, 27 (124th ed. 2004) (showing that over 70% of Nevada’s population resides in Las
Vegas, Clark County); Nevada Dept. of Employment Training & Rehabilitation, Current
Nevada Economic Indicators 4, available at http://www.nevadaworkforce.com/article.asp?
PAGEID=&SUBID=&ARTICLEID=2749&SEGMENTID=0.  Additionally, Clark and
Washoe Counties are the two largest generators of gaming revenue in Nevada.
271 Merriam-Webster, Nevada, http://www.merriam-webster.com/cgi-bin/nytmaps.pl?
nevada (last visited Feb. 28, 2010).  Only 0.6% of Nevada’s total area is “urban and built-up
areas.” Id.
272 Id. at 28 (91.5% of Nevada’s population is concentrated in urban areas).
273 ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 360.
274 CalChamber, supra note 256 and accompanying text.
275 Gilson, supra note 75, passim.
276 Id. at 575.
277 CalChamber, supra note 256 and accompanying text.
278 Vaske v. DuCharme, McMillen & Assoc., Inc., 757 F. Supp. 1158, 1161 (D. Colo.
1990); Camco, Inc. v. Baker, 936 P.2d 829, 832 (Nev. 1997).
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and perhaps most importantly, both already have laws that disfavor but allow
post-employment restrictive covenants.279  Thus, Nevada can adopt Colorado
law without disrupting any legal precedent.280
If Nevada adopts the Colorado statute it would protect both businesses and
employees.  In particular, adopting Colorado’s statute would address trade
secret protection, employee training and education, and particular professions.
Moreover, protecting trade secrets provides incentive for businesses to incorpo-
rate in Nevada. However, to balance interests, any covenant must to be nar-
rowly tailored and reasonable.281  Investment in education and training affects
Nevada particularly.  Adopting the Colorado statute would allow employers to
invest in employee education and training without fear of losing their invest-
ment.282  It is important for the Nevada statute to draw upon Colorado’s case
law and require explicit contract provisions proscribing reimbursement of train-
ing expenses.283  Essentially, a contract would clearly state the conditions
under which an employee would be obligated to reimburse an employer for
training received during employment.  Lastly, the newly amended statute
should specifically identify the professions where restrictive covenants are void
for public policy.  For example, the statute should reflect the public policy deci-
sion that the law should not create a virtual monopoly on a doctor’s spe-
cialty.284  This minor exception still follows Nevada’s current case law but
would encourage more doctors to come to Nevada.  Additionally, the statute
should also provide an exception for attorneys because the law should allow
clients to freely choose their legal representation.285  Therefore, restricting the
clients’ choice is beyond the reach of state’s power and breaches the American
Bar Association’s model code.286
Now is the time for Nevada to act and insulate itself, in the area of
employment.  With the benefit of hindsight, Nevada law can adopt a law that
reflects modern trends in employment law, protects knowledge-based fields,
businesses, employees, and bolsters Nevada’s economic stability.  Through the
adoption of these new laws, Nevada will attract more business to the state and
protect its workforce.  The proposed balanced standard presents a tenable solu-
tion respecting Nevada’s workforce and economy.
279 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113 (West 2003); NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.200 (2007).
280 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.200; see supra note 194 and accompanying text.
281 Mgmt. Recruiters of Boulder, Inc. v. Miller, 762 P.2d 763, 766 (Colo. App. Ct. 1988)
(upholding a narrowly construed and reasonable non-compete agreement).
282 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-2-113(2)(c).
283 Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Sandvick, 732 F.2d 783, 788 (10th Cir. 1984).  In Dresser, the
court held that the statute was inapplicable because the “employment agreements contained
no provision requiring reimbursement of training expenses.” Id.  This is instructive to
require Nevada employment contracts to contain a reimbursement provision.
284 Graham v. Cirocco, 69 P.3d 194, 199 (Kan. Ct. App. 2003).
285 Cattani et al., supra note 42, § 2.1.4(d).
286 See id.  The Massachusetts Model Rule 5.6 mirrors the corresponding ABA Model Rule
except in reference to private parties.
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APPENDIX
Current Nevada Statute
§ 613.200  Prevention of employment of person who has been discharged or who
terminates employment unlawful; criminal and administrative penalties; exception.
1.  Except as otherwise provided in this section, any person, association, com-
pany or corporation within this State, or any agent or officer on behalf of the
person, association, company or corporation, who willfully does anything
intended to prevent any person who for any cause left or was discharged from
his or its employ from obtaining employment elsewhere in this State is guilty of
a gross misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine of not more than $5,000.
2.  In addition to any other remedy or penalty, the Labor Commissioner may
impose against each culpable party an administrative penalty of not more than
$5,000 for each such violation.
3.  If a fine or an administrative penalty is imposed pursuant to this section, the
costs of the proceeding, including investigative costs and attorney’s fees, may
be recovered by the Labor Commissioner.
4.  The provisions of this section do not prohibit a person, association, company,
corporation, agent or officer from negotiating, executing and enforcing an agree-
ment with an employee of the person, association, company or corporation
which, upon termination of the employment, prohibits the employee from:
a.  Pursuing a similar vocation in competition with or becoming employed
by a competitor of the person, association, company or corporation; or
b.  Disclosing any trade secrets, business methods, lists of customers, secret
formulas or processes or confidential information learned or obtained dur-
ing the course of his employment with the person, association, company or
corporation, if the agreement is supported by valuable consideration and is
otherwise reasonable in its scope and duration.
Proposed Nevada Statute
§ 613.200  Prevention of employment of person who has been discharged or who
terminates employment unlawful; criminal and administrative penalties; exception.
1.  Except as otherwise provided in this section, any person, association, com-
pany or corporation within this State, or any agent or officer on behalf of the
person, association, company or corporation, who willfully does anything
intended to prevent any person who for any cause left or was discharged from
his or its employ from obtaining employment elsewhere in this State is guilty of
a gross misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine of not more than $5,000.
2.  In addition to any other remedy or penalty, the Labor Commissioner may
impose against each culpable party an administrative penalty of not more than
$5,000 for each such violation.
3.  If a fine or an administrative penalty is imposed pursuant to this section, the
costs of the proceeding, including investigative costs and attorney’s fees, may
be recovered by the Labor Commissioner.
4.  The provisions of this section do not prohibit a person, association, company,
corporation, agent or officer from negotiating, executing and enforcing an agree-
ment with an employee of the person, association, company or corporation
which, upon termination of the employment, prohibits the employee from:
a.  Pursuing a similar vocation in competition with or becoming employed
by a competitor of the person, association, company or corporation; or
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b.  Disclosing any trade secrets, business methods, lists of customers, secret
formulas or processes or confidential information learned or obtained dur-
ing the course of his employment with the person, association, company or
corporation, if the agreement is supported by valuable consideration and is
otherwise reasonable in its scope and duration.
4.  Any covenant not to compete which restricts the right of any person to
receive compensation for performance of skilled or unskilled labor for any
employer shall be void, but this subsection shall not apply to:
a.  Any contract for the purchase and sale of a business or the assets of
a business;
b.  Any contract for the protection of trade secrets;
c.  Any contractual provision providing for recovery of the expense of
educating and training an employee who has served an employer for a
period of less than two years;
d.  Executive and management personnel and officers and employees
who constitute professional staff to executive and management
personnel.
5.  Any covenant not to compete provision of an employment, partnership,
or corporate agreement between physicians which restricts the right of a
physician to practice medicine, upon termination of such agreement, shall
be void; except that all other provisions of such an agreement enforceable
at law, including provisions which require the payment of damages in an
amount that is reasonably related to the injury suffered by reason of termi-
nation of the agreement, shall be enforceable. Provisions which require the
payment of damages upon termination of the agreement may include, but
not be limited to, damages related to competition.
6.  In a civil action brought against the employer, the court may not create
a new agreement for the parties to uphold the contract where the severabil-
ity of the agreement is not evident from the contract itself.
